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Jackson: Tactics of Strategic Competition

TAC TICS OF STR ATEGIC COMPETITION
Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts before War
Van Jackson

D

efense analysts and policy makers now refer routinely to the challenges of
operating in a “gray zone” of conflict, which coincides with recent scholarly
efforts to analyze more rigorously conflicts short of traditional coercion or war.1
Yet despite its frequent contemporary usage, the term gray zone does not seem to
describe anything new. However, it does highlight something that is underconceptualized: the use of tactics that challenge the status quo without resorting to
war. This article proposes that the gray zone is not a new concept, but that the
term conveniently describes a broad class of events involving nonwar yet conflictual interactions—what might be considered “normal” or “stable” strategic competition. Taking policy makers’ concerns seriously, I argue that at least three types
of interrelated tactics are historically common, if underconceptualized, ways of
pursuing competitive gains while deferring the decision for war: sidestepping
established defender “redline” commitments; employing intermediary actors as
aggressors; and presenting faits accomplis to defenders.
Each of these tactics has ample historical precVan Jackson is an associate professor in the College of
edent; yet, as discussed below, each is also vastly
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revisionist tactics also undermines suggestions that the gray zone of conflict
represents a brave new world. What is more, recognizing when such tactics are
in play has payoffs for how we might expect conflict interactions to unfold—the
presence of each tactic plausibly biases the outcomes of strategic interactions in
favor of those who take the initiative, while also introducing the classic risks of
unintentional escalation.
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts. The first part introduces
the modern usage of the term gray zone, its conceptual limitation, and three
interrelated tactics that simultaneously try to avoid inciting crisis or war while
pursuing revisionist aims—the essence of the gray-zone challenge, as explained
by its advocates. The second part makes a prima facie attempt to identify the ways
in which these revisionist tactics logically complicate competitive interactions in
international relations (i.e., how their employment plausibly affects the interplay
of conflict, on the basis of their presence in familiar historical examples as well as
the causal logics identified in the sparse but relevant literatures). The final part
surveys a diverse range of modern cases of international competition to illustrate
the centrality of these revisionist tactics to explaining those cases.
UNDERSTANDING THE GRAY ZONE . . . OR NOT
The term gray zone appears almost nowhere in scholarly literature. Among security practitioners, the broadest and most consistent use of the term seems to
describe what amounts to a realpolitik state of competition short of war.2 Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work acknowledged that “agents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial” constitute “what some people
have called ‘the gray zone,’” arguing that it is the type of conflict for which U.S.
forces are least prepared.3 The former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics similarly eschewed the term itself but addressed
the crux of the problem by describing the category of conflict in a 2015 internal
memo as one “that occurs again and again. These conflicts are regional, may be
presented by an insurgency against a standing government, military and political activities within a sovereign nation conducted by a neighbor, disputes over
territory between neighboring nations, or terrorist or criminal activities within
ungoverned territories or within failing states.”4 The memo even explained why
these activities are a problem: “In these conflicts it has been very difficult to assess
the situation and to determine what U.S. interests are at stake, . . . determining
what actions should the U.S. take to protect those interests, who our allies and
adversaries are in the particular situation, and what end-state would be best to
protect our interests and result in the most favorable outcome.”5
But the gray zone is not a concern only for the U.S. government. In track 1.5
meetings with U.S. officials and analysts, South Korean and Japanese officials
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/4
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have expressed rising angst that gray-zone challenges may erode the credibility
of U.S. commitments.6 In particular, the government of Japan, which started using the term in 2010, has defined gray zones as “armed incidents that fall short
of a full-scale attack.”7 Examples that officials have offered to illustrate what
Japan means by the term gray zone range from Chinese special operations forces
infiltrating the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dressed as fishermen to drone
intrusions or cyber attacks aimed at compelling Japan to stand down in the event
of a remote confrontation in the East China Sea.8 Japan’s Defense of Japan 2014
annual white paper also articulates concerns that gray-zone situations will pre
sent the country with scenarios in which a military response might be necessary,
but only its coast guard or law-enforcement agencies would have the authority to
act.9 A number of scholars and pundits additionally have seized on the term to
describe contemporary cases of competition, ranging from recent North Korean
violence and Russia’s annexation of Crimea to China’s East China Sea policy and
its ongoing artificial island building in contested areas of the South China Sea.10
Although the term gray zone is not inherently problematic, it risks obscuring
the actual observed behaviors that are raising concerns among policy makers. If
focusing on the gray zone amounts to nothing more than identifying the numerous types of conflict short of war, there is little obvious benefit in aggregating
them into a master category labeled gray zone. The term can be a convenient
descriptive shorthand for referring to nonwar competition, but its use leaves
unresolved any adequate explanation for how and why the behaviors of contemporary international actors apparently vex security practitioners to the point of
leading many to reach for a new term.
But these public discussions of gray zones highlight a policy-relevant theoretical lacuna regarding revisionist tactics short of launching conventional war that
make it possible for revisionists to establish new status quo baselines, secure gains
at the expense of a competitor, and shape future bargaining contexts, all without
automatically requiring coercive diplomacy, crisis, or war. From scanning the
range of cases and definitions of gray zones that the practitioners and scholars
mentioned above have advanced, three interrelated ideal-type tactics emerge:
revisionism that avoids defender commitments; employment of intermediary
actors; and faits accomplis.
The most obvious way to pursue an advantage while avoiding war is to avoid
challenging any commitment a defender has defined as a casus belli. In other
words, this means engaging in only those revisionist actions that sidestep defender redlines, the latter term understood as a commitment threshold for punishment or reaction.11 During the early Cold War period, Henry Kissinger and others
wrote of the need to defend the “grey areas” of the globe, meaning those countries
the NATO umbrella did not cover (i.e., the places where U.S. commitments were
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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sparse and of questionable credibility).12 Kissinger’s argument was a critique of
President Eisenhower’s massive retaliation doctrine, which Kissinger believed
basically prevented the United States from reacting to aggression in all situations
other than a large-scale Soviet invasion of Europe. Kissinger feared that Cold
War adversaries around the world would pursue political and military expansion
in areas where the U.S. willingness to wage war or incur risks of conflict had not
been established or was less than obvious. Much more recently, it has been argued
that competitive states historically have exploited—and have enduring incentives
to exploit—what Daniel Altman also calls “gray areas,” challenging a defender
not where its resolve is clearest but rather where its commitments or retaliation
thresholds have weaknesses, which come in several varieties.13
As I describe it here, though, the tactic of redline avoidance shares more in
common with Kissinger’s “grey areas” than Altman’s “gray areas.” The difference
is subtle but conceptually and practically meaningful. With the tactic of redline
avoidance, the revisionist is choosing a site of contestation involving issues or
geographies where it views a defender’s redline commitments as being absent.
The tactic does not constitute exploitation of a weak redline but rather exploitation of the absence of one. In 1962, the U.S. redline against Soviet invasion of
Europe was strong, while no redline existed against Soviet missiles in Cuba prior
to the Cuban missile crisis; in other words, there was not a weak redline against
Soviet missiles in Cuba, but rather no redline whatsoever. By contrast, Altman’s
redline typology and corresponding “gray areas” describe revisionism that exploits loopholes in perceived redlines. Such revisionism encroaches on a redline
without crossing it, rather than avoiding it.14 The conceptual difference can be
seen in the prelude to the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev
is said to have thought that there was no U.S. commitment with regard to missiles in Cuba (redline avoidance), which is different from saying that he thought
he was exploiting a U.S. commitment (redline encroachment) that was weak or
not credible.15
For policy makers, these are two fundamentally different problems. The
former is about vulnerabilities where one allowed an absence of commitments,
while the latter is about vulnerabilities arising from flaws in established commitments. To be sure, exploiting weak redlines is one way to challenge the status quo
without resorting to war; that is a basic argument not only in this article but in the
recent research on redlines.16 However, as the historical example above illustrates,
challenging the status quo while avoiding redlines altogether is tactically different from encroaching on weak redlines; I treat the latter (encroaching on weak
redlines) as a subset of the discussion on faits accomplis, below.
One way that revisionists avoid a defender’s redlines—a method that also can
be used to encroach on a defender’s redlines without crossing them—is through
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/4
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the second revisionist tactic: employing intermediaries. From prisoners’ dilemmas to games of chicken, theories of competition in international relations often
employ a simplifying assumption of dyadic interaction.17 But many conflicts
short of conventional war involve an aggressor’s third-party agents, not conventional military forces.
Intermediaries in international competition are conceptualized in at least
three ways in the literature. First, in proxy wars, intermediaries are secondary
states or rebel groups whose war fighting benefits, or at least is consonant with,
the goals of a primary state. States resorting to proxy wars do so in part because
they find themselves in rivalry or strategic competition with another state, yet are
deterred by the prospective costs of fighting a war directly; this is also a prevailing
logic of covert war.18
Second, in the literature on third-party or “indirect” deterrence, intermediaries are those actors to whom pressure is applied so that they may in turn apply
pressure to still another actor.19 A common, if faulty, argument about how best to
pressure North Korea has been to pressure China, which has unique economic
leverage over North Korea and might succeed in coercing North Korea where the
United States and South Korea have not.20
A third conceptualization of intermediaries that more commonly fits the kind
found in the gray zone of conflict comes from the literature on state-sponsored
terrorism.21 Intermediaries in this context are the agents in a principal-agent
relationship and the state is the principal or patron, but the tie between them
is an ambiguous or tenuous one. Agents in this sense sometimes are described
colloquially as “little green men” or the “fifth column” to capture the deniable
manner in which a patron may employ them.22 They can be any agents of a state
that traditionally do not play a signaling role in executing the “high politics” of
international security, such as law-enforcement authorities or guerrillas, or moreautonomous actors that implicitly act on behalf of an aggressor, including terrorist groups, computer hackers, fishermen, and even members of social movements
or an ethnically bonded diaspora.
The distinction is meaningful because the use of militaries activates instrumental logics of either deterrence or battlefield efficiency between competitors.23
Intermediaries, by contrast, do not activate such logics as readily, which, as discussed below, is one of the reasons their presence both can “stack the deck” of
interaction in favor of defender restraint and can generate distinct risks of miscalculation or blowback.24 Thus, China’s coast guard or its maritime militia—the latter is affiliated with the central government but is not a war-making instrument
of the state—may engage in confrontational actions in the East or South China
Sea. Such actions force defenders to ponder the extent to which—especially
in contrast with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy under comparable
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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circumstances—they reflect a deliberately aggressive design by Beijing.25 The
military instrument brings with it certain kinds of expectations and implied risks
with regard to confrontation, while the actions of other agents of a state introduce
at least the possibility of doubt about the logic governing their behavior.
An aggressor that employs an intermediary obscures culpability by obscuring
identification of authority, assumptions of control, or intent. From the defender’s
perspective, the use of intermediaries in any competitive interaction raises logical questions about these same factors. If the defender cannot know the answers
to these questions with any great degree of confidence, then neither can it know
whom to influence or how to do so.
Intermediaries in conflicts short of war are not passive or trivial actors. Often,
they present defenders with a fait accompli, which is to say an “initiative that
forces the opponent to initiate” or to stand aside.26 Faits accomplis have a long
history in international politics, and in crisis bargaining in particular, but prior
to recent research by Ahmer Tarar and Daniel Altman they were entirely untheorized.27 This may be due in part to what faits accomplis are: unilateral acts that
come at the expense of a competitor’s preferences.28 They often present defenders with the choice of taking no direct action (i.e., backing down) or initiating a
coercive interaction; in other words, they can, but do not inherently, constitute
coercive actions themselves. Because faits accomplis often sidestep deterrence
and compellence and leave the decision to initiate such hostilities to the defender,
paradoxically—and sometimes intentionally—faits accomplis potentially transform a defender into a seeming aggressor.29
As illustrated in the figure, faits accomplis can be gradualist or decisive, and
coercive or noncoercive. In the coercive bargaining literature, some gradualist
fait accompli strategies are what Thomas C. Schelling famously called “salami
VARIATIONS OF THE FAIT ACCOMPLI
Decisive

Egypt’s nationalization of the
Suez Canal (1956)

Russian intervention in Crimea
(2014)

How Decisive?
China’s land reclamation in the
South China Sea (2013−present)

North Korean provocations
(1966−present)

Gradual
Noncoercive
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tactics”: deliberate erosion of a defender’s redline by consciously attempting to
stay below the perceived threshold for reaction.30 Salami slicing presents defenders with situations, “none of which in isolation amounts to a casus belli, but
which add up over time to a substantial change in the strategic picture.”31 While
“not quite invoking the commitment,” in other words, they manage to make “the
commitment appear porous and infirm.”32 Faits accomplis that take the form of
salami tactics are revisionist attempts to exploit a weak redline, providing specific
revisionist paths of least resistance (or windows of opportunity, if one prefers),
considering the nature of the redline’s weakness.33
But faits accomplis need be neither gradual nor coercive. They also can be
decisive; alternatively, they can involve no threat making or redline erosion
whatsoever. For example, a sudden military operation aimed at quickly seizing
and occupying a swath of territory presents a defender with a fait accompli that
is decisive, not gradual. One recent study found that territorial acquisition by fait
accompli (defined as a unilateral, noncoercive “landgrab”) is both more common
and more successful than attempts to acquire territory by coercion.34 Another
study, also focusing narrowly on military faits accomplis that pursue decisive
“landgrabs,” finds that they are often the consequence of a commitment problem
in which the revisionist believes the defender will undertake military preparations (regardless of promises to the contrary) that would nullify or raise the costs
of a fait accompli.35 Moreover, states may perform research and development on
advanced weaponry or deploy military assets in outer space as ways to shift the
military balance without intending to challenge or threaten an adversary; in such
instances, an adversary not only may not have thought to introduce a redline but
may not know whether such a situation warrants one.36
Even the convergence of these tactics—intermediaries and faits accomplis,
put to the service of exploiting ambiguities in defender commitments or avoiding defender commitments altogether—does not make gray zones a category of
conflict that stands independent of coercive diplomacy, hybrid conflict, or other
types of bounded conflict interactions short of conventional war. Such an understanding would conflate conflict tactics with conflict types. Instead, the gray
zone, should the term be used at all, reflects a convenient description of normal
strategic competition. The tactics we find in the gray zone are deployable in any
competitive setting.
REVISIONIST TACTICS AND CONFLICT DYNAMICS
As a starting point for understanding how these tactics matter, this section draws
on the applicable literature as well as classic historical examples to construct
plausible claims about their causal implications.
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How Avoiding Redlines Affects Conflict
There are several ways in which aggressors can challenge the status quo while
encouraging defender restraint. The most prominent way of doing so while
avoiding war is by steering clear of a defender’s clearest redlines entirely, pressing
only where one believes defender commitments do not exist. Deterrence theory
long has identified an inherent trade-off when it comes to threat making: when
a defender establishes clear redlines for the sake of credible deterrence, “there is
a good possibility of a gap emerging.”37 An adversary may interpret issues and
areas that go unmentioned as permissible arenas for actions that will be less likely
to trigger retaliatory commitments. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined the “defense perimeter” of U.S. commitments in Asia in January 1950, he
failed to mention Korea. This proved to be one of several reasons North Korea’s
Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin thought North Korea could invade South Korea quickly; by leaving Korea out of the articulation of U.S. defense
commitments, Acheson inadvertently may have signaled that North Korea could
advance there without risking a larger war with the United States.38 This example
illustrates how an opportunistic aggressor may target issues and geographies
where defender commitments are absent, expecting that it can do so at less cost
and risk. Acheson’s announced defense perimeter and the outbreak of the Korean
War constitute merely one of the best-known examples in a twentieth century full
of them.39 Kissinger’s 1955 call to defend “grey areas” (that is, non-NATO areas
of U.S. interest) was an explicit recognition of this kind of possibility.40 The reactive temptation for defenders facing this exploitive tactic is simply to add new or
clarifying commitments to cover those ambiguities where an adversary may assert itself. But such a defender strategy involves high risk and brings diminishing
returns, because there comes a point at which the accumulation of commitments
to employ force logically outstrips the ability to maintain them credibly. Such an
aggressor tactic thus encourages the defender to be discerning, and somewhat
restrained, about adding new commitments or clarifying existing ones.
Before its eruption into the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev’s attempt to place
nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba can be seen as an initially noncoercive move intended to shift the military balance by taking action in an area other than Europe,
where commitments were more entrenched. The Soviet Union, in other words,
may have believed “that there was no tacit commitment on Kennedy’s part to
oppose such a deployment.”41 By shifting the military balance in its favor while
avoiding U.S. redlines, the Soviet Union was attempting to gain a geostrategic
advantage without engaging directly in a coercive contest.
But, as with North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, Khrushchev’s decision
to place Soviet missiles in Cuba illustrates the risk an aggressor incurs when
altering the status quo in places and on issues where defender commitments
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/4
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seem unclear, weak, or absent: underestimating the defender’s resolve. In neither
case did the aggressor seek to precipitate what became the Korean War and the
Cuban missile crisis, respectively, but in neither case was the United States willing simply to allow the aggressor’s actions to stand. Even though by using this
tactic—challenging the status quo in a manner that avoids a defender redline,
while targeting issues or areas high on uncertainty and low on precedent—
aggressors aim to achieve gains while avoiding conflict, doing so risks crisis or
conflict anyway. In cyberspace, for example, there are indications that U.S. strategic ambiguity about cyber attacks may reflect the uncertainty of U.S. officials
about the conditions that might lead to U.S. retaliatory attacks.42 If the United
States is unclear about its own retaliatory thresholds, then surely state-sponsored
hackers in China, North Korea, and elsewhere are as well.
How Faits Accomplis Affect Conflict
Regardless of whether a fait accompli is coercive or noncoercive, decisive or
gradual, it presents defenders with incentives either to back down or to take
coercive action themselves. The deliberate use of faits accomplis, as opposed to
some other type of aggressive action, involves an implicit wager that the action
taken will encourage restraint and not provoke defender retaliatory measures.43
It can do this in at least two different ways. The first is by moving too quickly
and completely for the defender to react because of material or capability constraints. North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea was intended to do just this,
presenting the United States with a situation on the ground that was so far gone
it could not plausibly be reversed. In his memoir Khrushchev recalls that Stalin’s
decision to permit Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea was premised on the
assumption “that if the war were fought swiftly . . . intervention by the USA could
be avoided.”44 The second way a fait accompli encourages defender paralysis is by
making the action such a small or gradual challenge to a defender’s redline that
the defender finds it difficult to justify mustering a retaliatory response. Such
gradualism can be seen in China’s repeated intrusions into the airspace surrounding the highly disputed (with Japan) Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China
Sea. Each such occurrence forces the Japan Self-Defense Forces to scramble fighter aircraft to intercept and turn back the intruders. Between 2006 and 2014, the
frequency of such high-friction encounters in the areas surrounding the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands has risen steadily, reaching a peak of 464 aerial intrusions in
2014.45 Each incident is too minor for Japan to base thereon a credible threat of
retaliation, but such incidents nevertheless repeatedly put Japan in the position
of either scrambling fighters to confront intruders or simply allowing Chinese
intrusions to go unchecked. The latter would establish a de facto precedent of
Chinese presence in Japan-administered territory against the latter country’s will.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 47

9

4/21/17 8:35 AM

48

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 4

When deployed during noncrises and nonwar situations, faits accomplis thus
“stack the deck” of strategic interaction in favor of the aggressor at the expense of
the defender’s preferences by encouraging restraint in the latter. But, as with any
wager, there is a risk of being wrong. With faits accomplis, from the aggressor’s
perspective, the cost of being wrong takes the form of unintentionally triggering
coercion or retaliation from the defender. Inadvertent conflict and escalation
are possible if an aggressor attempting a fait accompli has misjudged where a
defender’s redline is (i.e., what its retaliatory commitments are) or its resolve (i.e.,
its willingness to retaliate when its redline proscription is violated).46 From the
defender’s perspective, the costs of inaction when presented with a fait accompli
must be weighed against the costs of initiating retaliation and the risk of escalating a conflict. Kim Il Sung’s gamble that the United States would not intervene to
reverse North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950 certainly ended up incurring a high cost. But miscalculation-based escalation also can result from faits accomplis that do not involve military invasions or “landgrabs.” For instance, when
Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser presented his famous fait accompli of
nationalizing the Suez Canal in 1956, he inadvertently catalyzed British, French,
and Israeli coordinated war plans, leading to Israeli ground forces’ seizure of the
Sinai Peninsula.47 Nasser’s unilateral yet noncoercive declaration proved to be a
gamble that did not pay off for Egypt.
Even if an aggressor has not misjudged an adversary’s likely reaction to a
proximate incident, there are broader risks from second-order or ancillary reactions. Between the United States and North Korea during the 1960s, for example,
North Korean salami tactics, in the form of small-scale violence, repeatedly were
met with either U.S. decision paralysis or conciliatory offers to resolve an incident
peacefully.48 While this might be framed as North Korea besting the United States
in a string of specific incidents, the larger history worked against North Korea.
The United States may have been “boxed in” to de facto acceptance of North
Korea’s violent provocations—because the incidents were too minor to warrant
retaliation—but it coped with that unsavory reality in ways anathema to North
Korean interests: by redoubling its commitment to ally South Korea, enhancing
the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, providing greater financial
assistance to South Korean military modernization, and conducting grander
military exercises.49
How Intermediaries Affect Conflict
The presence of intermediaries in conflict interaction represents either some
degree of delegation of authority from a principal to an executing agent or the deceptive appearance of delegated authority. From a defender’s perspective, it may
be unclear what degree of autonomy an intermediary has, the degree to which
an intermediary is compliant with an aggressor’s prerogatives, and whether there
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/4
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even is a principal-agent relationship between the aggressor and the intermediary. Consequently, the presence of aggressor intermediaries structures strategic
interaction in several ways that are potentially favorable to the aggressor—but
with distinct risks.
One way, similar to the fait accompli approach, is to induce defender inaction
or decision paralysis by complicating the task of identifying retaliatory targets.
Attribution, a common problem with cyber attacks in particular, is essential
for mounting retaliation or countercoercion.50 And even if a defender can link
intermediaries and their patrons together accurately, ambiguities remain about
the extent to which an intermediary is a mindless agent of a patron as opposed to
a rogue actor.51 The United States quickly traced the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures
Studios to intermediaries acting on behalf of the North Korean regime, but it was
not immediately clear what exactly that meant.52 Were the perpetrators Chinese
hackers for hire? Were they government operatives executing orders received
from the regime in Pyongyang? Or were they autonomous actors launching attacks and making threats out of symbolic or identity solidarity with the North
Korean regime?
The use of intermediaries also can enhance the credibility of aggressor threat
making if it ties the hands of an aggressor, which can induce defender restraint
through successful coercion. Daniel L. Byman and Sarah E. Kreps claim this as a
major motivation of state-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East.53 Iran employs
Hezbollah and Palestinian terror groups as intermediaries against Israel in part
to credibly threaten retaliation for any and all grievances with Israel, whereas
the relatively poor state of Iran’s military does not allow it to make such blanket
retaliatory threats directly.54 Credible threats of retaliation come in the form of
support to intermediaries because direct interstate conflict per se would not favor
Iran, in contrast with terrorist groups that are openly at war with Israel and credibly can engage in continuous retaliation if called on to do so.
A third way intermediary agents benefit the aggressor state is by giving it
greater freedom of action through plausible deniability.55 An aggressor may seek
openly to associate itself with, and claim responsibility for, intermediary actions,
but only after they occur; plausible deniability allows it to take such a “wait and
see” approach. Conversely, an aggressor may seek to distance itself from the actions of autonomous intermediaries whose actions go too far, crossing a defender’s redlines, or with whose tactics they disagree. The aggressor thus may employ
intermediaries to give itself the latitude either to claim the benefits or to avoid the
costs of intermediary actions. The plausible deniability that intermediaries offer
also may allow for more aggressive salami tactics than a revisionist might pursue
using direct military force.
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Although intermediaries may skew interaction in the patron’s favor in multiple
ways, risks of backfire or negative feedback remain. Delegating a task inherently
involves some amount of risk (e.g., of the agent committing unintended errors
or taking undesirable independent actions).56 By relinquishing direct control to
a degree, an aggressor may have its hands undesirably tied. And when the linkage between an aggressor and its intermediary is grounded in a shared identity
or raison d’être, the aggressor may find it difficult to disassociate itself from the
intermediary, should it seek to do so. States that employ relatively autonomous
intermediaries run a risk of being “chain-ganged” into escalation of conflicts they
sought to avoid.
Use of intermediaries also risks engendering defender reactions of retaliation
or escalation. If an intermediary takes actions the defender finds unacceptable,
plausible deniability may not be enough to stifle a defender’s revenge-motivated
reaction. Decision makers are often willing to impose certainty on and form
beliefs about situations that are fundamentally uncertain.57 Politicians in a
defending state may feel public pressure to react quickly and forcefully and to
find a retaliatory scapegoat even if attribution is not immediately known—
sometimes uncertainty is no excuse for inaction. Even if an intermediary
complies perfectly and precisely with the intent of an aggressor, moreover, it
nevertheless may be the case that the aggressor misjudged either the defender’s
willingness to respond or its mode of response. Escalation logically could follow
either type of misjudgment.
DEGREES OF GRAY
As with all theoretical choices, analytic narratives constructed with a “revisionist tactics lens” foreground some elements over others to explain events. This is
not to trivialize other factors, nor to claim that contexts that exclude revisionist
tactics do not also bedevil policy makers. But there is a mismatch between the
academic literature’s lack of emphasis on redline avoidance, intermediaries, and
faits accomplis and policy makers’ growing concern about them.
Event Selection
The table compares several contemporary cases involving revisionism that avoids
or defers decisions for conventional war. These specific events with these specific
actors merit attention because they have been at the center of debates between
critics and advocates of the term gray zone. Demonstrating that the aforementioned revisionist tactics played a nontrivial role in the unfolding of events supports both aspects of my claim about the gray-zone debate.
First, the causal logics articulated in the prior section derived in part from
examining important historical cases in the security and strategic studies canon.
This demonstrates that they have explanatory power in contemporary cases,
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IDENTIFYING GRAY-ZONE TACTICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Intermediaries
Involved?

Defenders Faced a
Fait Accompli?

Aggressor Avoided
Defender Redlines?

North Korean
artillery attack
(2010)

No

No

Yes

Defender restraint,
but adoption of
“proactive
deterrence” doctrine

North Korean naval
attack (2010)

No

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but international
investigation

North Korean hack
of Sony Pictures
(2014)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint

China’s ADIZ
declaration for the
East China Sea
(2013)

No

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but defiance of
Chinese claims

Chinese artificial
island building in
the South China Sea
(2013–present)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but increased U.S.
patrols and regional
security aid

Russian intervention
in Ukraine (2014–
present)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Defender restraint,
but renewed U.S.
emphasis on NATO;
military aid to
Ukraine

Event

Outcome

undermining notions that there is something new about the gray-zone security
challenges of the present.
Second, narratives of these cases would be incomplete without accounting for
revisionist tactics short of war, which repudiates claims that there is no explanatory value added in conceptualizing these tactics. Parsing any of these cases solely
with reference to logics of coercion, conventional war fighting, or game-theoretic
crisis bargaining not only would offer limited explanatory value but would sacrifice understanding of the similar role that redline avoidance, intermediaries, and
faits accomplis played across cases.
The range of cases reveals a common tendency (regardless of whether one
or all three revisionist tactics were employed): defender paralysis in response to
the immediate tactic, but inevitable second-order consequences in the form of
indirect responses.
North Korean Provocations
Twice in 2010, North Korea engaged in isolated acts of violence against South
Korea.58 The first was a torpedo attack that sank a South Korean naval ship in
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March of that year, killing all forty-six sailors on board. The second attack, eight
months later, was an artillery barrage against South Korean–administered islands
in a disputed maritime area near North Korea’s western coast, killing four South
Korean marines and critically injuring a mix of dozens of marines and civilians
on the island. North Korean conventional military forces conducted both attacks.
The torpedo attack, for which North Korea denied responsibility, was a covert
action in international waters, taking place far from the view of any onlookers.
The artillery attack, by contrast, was conducted close to the Korean Peninsula’s
coast and was filmed and broadcast in near real time on South Korean news stations. North Korea not only accepted responsibility for the latter attack; it claimed
the attack was a punitive measure in response to a South Korean military exercise
in the area, against which North Korea had issued warnings.
The torpedo attack effectively forced South Korea to choose between doing
nothing or retaliating despite North Korean denials of culpability. By comparison, the artillery attack is understood better as a coercive battlefield action, not a
fait accompli. Both were isolated, limited attacks that fell well short of triggering
a U.S. or South Korean invasion of North Korea, but did risk some retaliation.
Whereas the March torpedo attack generated political controversy within South
Korea about whether North Korea was actually responsible (a debate that prevented South Korean officials from being able to retaliate), the November artillery attack nearly led to South Korean punitive bombings of North Korea; these
were avoided narrowly, only because senior U.S. officials intervened with their
South Korean counterparts to prevent retaliation.59
Although in a crisis-bargaining sense North Korea came out of these interactions unscathed and succeeded in encouraging U.S. and South Korean restraint,
second-order consequences reified the hostility that gave rise to North Korean
violence in the first place. The March 2010 attack led directly to an international
investigation and the later imposition of punitive “5/24 sanctions” that cut off
North Korea from most sources of South Korean currency.60 The November 2010
attack, meanwhile, triggered the adoption of a South Korean “proactive deterrence” doctrine of preemption, acceleration of South Korean precision-strike
missile programs, and a discourse in support of South Korea developing an independent nuclear capability.61
Contrasting with these attacks was North Korea’s 2014 cyber attack against
Sony Pictures Studios in response to the latter’s insulting and subversive (from
North Korea’s perspective) movie The Interview, whose comedic plot centered
on two journalists who assassinate Kim Jong Un. This incident featured all three
gray-zone tactics. The hacker group, whose members called themselves the
“Guardians of Peace,” nominally was an independent entity, yet was acting in the
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interests of the North Korean regime.62 The group issued a number of threats—of
a digital and physical nature—aimed at preventing the public release of The Interview. Although the threats were to no avail and the movie eventually was released
without any violence, the hackers did disrupt Sony’s computer systems and stole
and released to the public proprietary internal company information, including
embarrassing e-mails from Sony executives.63 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation eventually traced the Guardians of Peace back to North Korea, but slowly,
and never definitively.64 To this day, North Korea refuses to take responsibility
for the Sony hack, and some (a minority) in the technology sector in the United
States persist in doubting North Korean culpability.65
The surreptitious intrusion into Sony’s internal information network and
subsequent public revelation of stolen information was a coercive, decisive, and
nonviolent fait accompli. It presented not only Sony but the U.S. government with
multiple types of direct threats, and forced both into a position that favored not
attempting any meaningful retaliation.
China’s East China Sea ADIZ Declaration
China long has contested the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan, which the latter administers. Every year since around 2006, China has increased the frequency
of its attempted air and naval intrusions into the area surrounding the disputed
islands, requiring Japan to increase the frequency with which it responds by
scrambling fighter aircraft to escort intruding Chinese assets out of the area.66
Some of these confrontations involve Chinese civil vessels and aircraft, but frequently they have involved Chinese military assets as well. Although most of
these confrontations have been resolved without incident, some have escalated
to militarized crises, leading to both sides issuing redline threats. Japan, for example, has threatened that any Chinese drone that unlawfully enters Senkaku
airspace will be shot down, while China has counterthreatened that any shootdown of a Chinese drone would be an “act of war.”67
Despite the highly contested nature of the East China Sea, in November 2013
China’s Ministry of National Defense declared an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) over most of the area. Imposition of an ADIZ would require incoming
aircraft to identify themselves to Chinese authorities and, if military, to request
permission. As with all ADIZs, a Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea would
allow China to “identify, monitor, control, and react to aircraft entering this
zone.”68 China also claims the right to take “defensive emergency measures”
against noncompliant aircraft, although it has not done so—yet.69 Although
ADIZ declarations have been common since the United States established the
first zone in 1950, the United States and China’s neighbors view China’s ADIZ
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as a provocative fait accompli because it was declared unilaterally, without prior
consultation, over a maritime area that is heavily contested with Japan.70
As an act of defiance that constituted a fait accompli of its own, the United
States flew a nuclear-capable B-52 bomber through China’s “ADIZ” only two
days after its proclamation. The aircraft neither announced itself nor sought
permission.71 Notwithstanding the symbolism, the B-52 flight was an isolated
act of signaling that changed nothing with respect to China’s ADIZ declaration.
While the United States, Japan, and South Korea do not recognize the East China
Sea ADIZ, they have not attempted to compel China to roll it back—which preserves China’s de facto “right” to enforce the ADIZ at will. A U.S. Congressional
Research Service report assessed that China was “asserting a maximalist position,
then seeming to back down, while preserving some incremental gain.”72 Secretary
of State John F. Kerry accused Beijing of “an attempt to change the status quo
in the East China Sea.”73 The ADIZ declaration involved no intermediaries but,
from the perspective of the United States and Japan, was indeed a decisive fait
accompli that also avoided triggering any kind of retaliatory commitments from
either the United States or China’s neighbors.
Chinese Artificial Island Building in the South China Sea
Although not the first country to do so, China since 2013 has engaged in a rapid
process of “land reclamation”—the construction of artificial islands—in the disputed South China Sea. In less than two years, it developed more than 2,900 acres
of “land” in a space of overlapping exclusive economic zones between China and
other South China Sea claimants.74 Since their construction, China has positioned weapons systems and military infrastructure—including radars, artillery,
runways, and military barracks—on them despite their being highly contested,
and despite Chinese claims that it is not “militarizing” the islands.75
China has not issued threats in relation to these artificial islands and has not
used them as yet to blockade others’ freedom of navigation. However, U.S. intelligence officials openly express concern that China gradually is putting in place
the physical ability to impose and enforce constraints on freedom of navigation
through the South China Sea, should it choose to do so.76 While the United States
maintains a commitment to freedom of navigation and open sea-lanes, that commitment is open-ended and abstract. The U.S. redline concerning freedom of
navigation is “arbitrary” and “imprecise”; the United States has issued no specific
“redline” threat to resort to military force to fulfill such a commitment, particularly in the South China Sea.77
This makes China’s land-reclamation activity a gradualist fait accompli that
does not overstep directly any retaliatory boundaries, and is not inherently
coercive or aggressive—even if such actions improve China’s position should

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/4

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 54

16

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Jackson: Tactics of Strategic Competition

JA C K S O N

55

it take aggressive actions in the future. Any direct military action to blockade
or attack Chinese artificial islands would require a decisive act of aggression
disproportionate to the mundane (if strategically significant) activities of engineers building artificial structures in international waters. So, while the United
States has increased its “presence” in the South China Sea in response to China’s
actions—including through maritime patrols, freedom-of-navigation military
exercises, and enhanced security assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines—
none of these actions have been aimed at, nor have they had the effect of, curbing
or rolling back China’s land-reclamation activity, which effectively establishes a
new status quo in the South China Sea.78
Russian Intervention in Ukraine
In 2014, Russia employed all three revisionist tactics in a campaign that culminated in the annexation of Crimea, formally and formerly part of Ukraine. Although the conflict had political antecedents dating back to the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, what immediately precipitated it was pro-European social forces
in Ukraine mobilizing to oust the country’s then president Viktor Yanukovych,
who was seen as subservient to Moscow. Within days of Yanukovych’s removal,
Russia capitalized on Ukraine’s domestic turmoil to insert large numbers of “little
green men”—undesignated and unidentifiable yet armed forces, widely believed
to belong to Russian special forces—who occupied key choke points and government buildings in Crimea, claiming to be separatists.79 Russia denied responsibility for these forces. Once the “little green men” established territorial control, a
controversial referendum of secession was held in Crimea, which led to Russia’s
formalized annexation of it.80
As these events evolved, in March 2014 the Donbas region of Ukraine filled
with anti-Ukrainian protests conducted largely by members of an ethnically Russian diaspora. These pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian protests quickly militarized,
and separatists in Donbas unilaterally declared independence from Ukraine. As
fighting continued throughout the year and into 2015, the Russian military provided arms and logistics to the separatist forces—some members of whom were
Russian citizens—that were fighting against the Ukrainian government. Russia
denied any military involvement in and culpability for the events.81 Thus, under
the cover of mobilized separatist forces in Ukraine, Russia waged what some describe as a “hybrid war” against the Ukrainian government to secure the political
independence of a region of sovereign Ukrainian territory.82
Russia’s “little green men” perpetrated a decisive fait accompli, and they did
so in a manner that avoided triggering retaliation or military incursions from
NATO or the United States. U.S. and European observers were quick to recognize
that Russia was behind the intervention of the “little green men” in Crimea.83
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Moreover, mounting evidence increasingly made Russian involvement—
especially in providing logistics support to the Donbas separatists—undeniable
to outside observers, although the use of such intermediaries allowed Russia to
continue its narrative of denial.84 But the rapid ability of the West to attribute the
conflict to Russia did not translate into any kind of military reaction, and Russia’s
aloofness made it virtually impossible to negotiate a cease-fire. As Russian foreign
minister Sergei Lavrov responded when confronted with evidence of Russia’s role
in events in Ukraine and demands for a cease-fire, “[B]efore demanding from us
that we stop doing something, please present proof that we have done it.”85
At the end of the Cold War, the United States, along with Russia and the
United Kingdom, agreed to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,
which afforded Ukraine underspecified “security assurances” after the latter relinquished the Soviet nuclear weapons remaining there.86 But this security commitment was ambiguous in terms of what was required of the United States, and
at any rate was not formalized in a treaty. In response to accusations that standing
by while Ukraine was being ravaged damaged U.S. and NATO credibility, the
United States was quick to point out that Ukraine was not a NATO member and
that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine did not invoke NATO’s article 5 collective
defense requirement; neither did the Budapest Memorandum require U.S. military commitments to Ukraine’s security.87
As a former U.S. defense official observed, Russia effectively succeeded in
“avoiding alliance tripwires while still subversively contributing to instability,
unrest, and violence in Ukraine.”88 By July and August 2014, Russian rank-andfile conventional forces, including artillery units, were crossing into Ukraine.
Yet even when Ukrainian forces captured Russian soldiers—a seeming “smoking
gun” of Russian culpability—Moscow persisted with its denials, claiming such
soldiers had crossed the border by mistake.89
Subsequently, the United States and NATO, both of which were unable to do
much beyond monitoring the situation from the outside, have strengthened their
ties to and presence in Eastern Europe. They have attempted to make clear that
a Crimea-like intervention would not be acceptable in a NATO country—even if
the populations of some of them, such as Estonia, contain sizable ethnic Russian
minorities.90
This article has attempted to examine several underlying tactics found in what
contemporary security practitioners sometimes reference as a “gray zone” of
conflict. Tactics other than war that seek to revise the status quo are historically
common yet undertheorized. As an initial remedy, this article has proposed that
avoidance of a defender’s clearest commitments, use of intermediary actors, and
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presentation with faits accomplis are indeed old tactics, long wielded by actors
seeking to challenge the status quo without resorting to conventional military
force.
But just because something is not new does not mean it has been conceptualized adequately. Revisionist tactics plausibly condition strategic interactions in
important ways: they encourage defender inaction, strengthen aggressor threat
credibility, allow aggressors to obscure culpability, and introduce proximate
escalation risks resulting from aggressor misjudgments or intermediaries going
rogue. As international politics becomes defined more in terms of a “diffusion of
power” and increasingly complex interdependencies, motivations for revisionism
are likely to endure. Such an environment may increase reliance on the tactics
examined here.91
While the gray zone is not a new concept, as an area of concern to military
commanders and policy makers it is understudied. This article has attempted to
fill that gap by identifying and examining the role of tactics in conflicts short of
conventional war, and by showing that such tactics make it possible for revisionists to secure gains while paralyzing defenders. This bolsters the claim that these
tactics constitute something distinct in international security and are worthy of
study, even if they are not new.
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